Romania did not reach its current state by accident. What we are experiencing today is the result of a long, coherent, and deliberate process that began immediately after December 1989 and was refined over three and a half decades. We are not talking about isolated mistakes or accidental incompetence, but about a system designed to fail in a controlled manner, for the benefit of narrow interest groups.
At the institutional level, corruption has become endemic. Administrative illiteracy was not only left unpunished—it was rewarded through promotion. Ministers without substance, agency heads without real competence, civil servants selected based on obedience rather than merit—all of this defines the architecture of the Romanian state after 1989. Competence was perceived as a threat, not as a resource.
The transition from communism to capitalism failed. Not exclusively due to internal causes, but also with the support of certain external actors—“unseen,” yet perfectly well known—directly or indirectly involved in the coup d’état of December 1989. Instead of an authentic reconstruction of the state, Romania was pushed into a gray zone, lacking solid legislation against corruption and corruption-related crimes.
This legislative delay immediately after 1989 was not an oversight. It was a calculation. The result was the transformation of Romania, starting in the 1990s, into a functional mafia state, where authorities pretended for years to fight organized crime while, in reality, working alongside it. A form of state-organized crime, protected politically and institutionally.
Subsequently, the European Union began to delay Romania with successive pretexts regarding pre-accession and full accession: “corrupt state,” “weak institutions,” “rule of law deficits.” A convenient hypocrisy. Because many of the major schemes involving rigged tenders, disastrous privatizations, and fraudulent contracts involved companies from EU member states—not obscure local entities.
Romania did not truly join the European Union. It bought its seat. It paid with its strategic assets, with the backbone of its national economy:
– Petrom
– Sidex
– Romtelecom
– the cement factories
– essential segments of the industrial and energy sectors
Assets sold for next to nothing, under the guise of “reform.” Without exaggeration, had Romania been at war continuously for 35 years, it would not have emerged as stripped and plundered as it did during this period of so-called “peace” and “integration.”
After this prolonged economic looting, Romania became a captured state. Captured by interest groups that include former agents of certain European intelligence services, who during their active years recruited Romanian citizens—later presented as “technocrats”—and placed them in key positions. These individuals worked, and continue to work, against the national interest, under the mask of modernization and Western expertise.
The entire mechanism functioned according to a model well known in the history of criminal organizations: the placement of loyal “lieutenants” in key nodes to control decisions and resources—an architecture comparable, methodologically, to that of Cosa Nostra or the ’Ndrangheta. Not in identity, but in modus operandi.
Several well-known individuals from the current governing group, operating under the coordination of Deputy Prime Minister Oana Gheorghiu and Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan, are mentioned in the public sphere as part of this control mechanism. In the case of the prime minister, there has been public speculation regarding his ability to withstand the pressure of the office—speculation that, in a normal state, would have been swiftly addressed through an official, authorized medical report. The absence of such clarification does not dispel suspicion; it amplifies it.
At the same time, the same power nucleus is alleged to have orchestrated a coordinated attack on Romania’s magistrates, using a network of NGOs funded for so-called “civic campaigns,” but in reality deployed to systematically discredit the judiciary. The goal was not reform, but political subordination of judges, so that major corruption cases could become negotiable.
Negotiable for whom?
For politicians across the entire political spectrum, but with a visible concentration around figures from the Save Romania Union (USR), a party that built its electoral capital precisely on anti-corruption rhetoric.
A telling example is the appointment of Vlad Voiculescu as a presidential adviser. A former Minister of Health, he is a suspect in a case concerning vaccine procurement during the COVID-19 period—a case that has not been publicly clarified to this day.
From here, a legitimate and unavoidable question arises:
Let us assume, Mr. Nicușor Dan, that you are an honest president.
Why, and for what reasons, did you appoint a presumptive criminal to a position of such dignity?
There are only two possible explanations, both grave:
– either you are being blackmailed by certain influence circles within USR, in which case you have a legal and moral obligation to inform the state’s security institutions and request protection;
– or you are not being blackmailed, in which case you have the immediate obligation to dismiss Vlad Voiculescu.
Any other option no longer falls under political ambiguity. It amounts to complicity.
The culmination of this process was reached in December 2024, when a shadowy but well-organized group annulled the elections. The real motive was not stability or legality, but buying time. Time to identify, construct, and push forward a political puppet capable of winning the presidential elections of May 2025.
From that point on, everything follows a clear logic. We are no longer talking about deviations, but about the complete capture of the democratic process—obedient institutions, a pressured judiciary, and a state used exclusively to preserve power.
This is no longer a crisis.
It is the final outcome of a project begun in 1989 and perfected over 35 years.
Romania is not weak.
Romania is being held down.
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